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Rosemary Cairns Way* Reconceptualizing
Professional Responsibility:
Incorporating Equality
Are legal professionals concerned with "doing good" or just with "doing well"
financially? In an age of increasing and intensifying public scrutiny there is a
need to examine and challenge the legal profession's conception of professional
responsibility, and how it translates into practice. This paper expresses the concern
that the profession has moved too far in the direction of a "billable hours" culture,
a culture that is falling short of the legal profession's obligation as a self-regulated
entity to consider and acknowledge the public interest at all points. The author
calls for a broader conception of professionalism, one that encompasses more
than service for the client. This standard cannot be attained without a commitment
to incorporating equality into all facets and corners of the profession. The Charter's
broad and generous equality provisions, and the Supreme Court's subsequent
expansive interpretations have entrenched the equality value as a fundamental
component of the legal system. As a result, it is imperative for the legal profession
to exhibit a commitment to justice that moves beyond rhetoric and translates into
practice. While acknowledging the lack of simple solutions, the author discusses
the National Judicial Institute 's Social Context Education Project as an example of
the judiciary's efforts to respond to these issues. The profession is challenged to
follow the judiciary's lead and incorporate equality issues more fully into its formal
institutional structures and informal norms.
Les avocats s'int6ressent-ils plutt a la r6ussite financiere ou au bien-6tre du client?
A I'epoque ou le public questionne davantage, il faut examiner et questionner
comment les avocats congoivent leurs responsabilit~s professionnelles et comment
cette responsabilit6 sapplique au quotidien. Lauteure s'inquiete des tendances
actuelles ou le professionnel s'occupe de la facturation plutt que de ses
responsabilit~s; cette profession qui 6tablit ses propres reglements ne consid~re
pas toujours l'int6r~t du public. Pour atteindre ce but, les avocats doivent s'assurer
que I'aspect d'6galit6 fasse partie de leur travail. Les dispositions g6n~reuses de
la Chartre et la vaste interpretation de la Cour Supreme par Ia suite ont enchiss6
le concept de 1'6galite dans le syst6mejuridique. Par la suite, I'avocat doit s'engager
6 un syst~me qui d6passe la forme pour devenirpratique courante. Tout en tenant
compte qu'il n'est pas facile de trouver une solution a ce probleme, I'auteure cite
le 'Projet de sensibilisation au contexte social de I'lnstitut national de la magistrature'
comme un exemple des efforts de la magistrature pour adresser ces questions. II
faut que la profession suive I'initiative de la magistrature en incorporant les questions
d'6galit6 non seulement dans les normes administratives 6tablies mais 6galement
dans le journalier
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Ottawa.
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Introduction
This paper is based on a lecture delivered at Dalhousie Law School on
November 21, 2002. The F.B.Wickwire Lecture on Professional
Responsibility is co-sponsored by the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society and
Dalhousie Law School. The topic area of the lecture series, professional
responsibility, reflects the commitment and professional engagement of
Frederick Wickwire Q.C., whose outstanding work as chair of the Handbook
Committee is reflected in the Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct
Handbook of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society.' When I was preparing
to deliver the lecture which is the basis for this article, I spent many anxious
hours searching for my "hook." The hook, in my imagination, would be a
clever oratorical device intended to capture the audience's attention, engage
their interest, serve as a unifying theme, and, in a perfect world, make them
laugh. Lacking confidence in my ability to spin a good tale, or even to
deliver a joke effectively, I turned to the Internet to find a cartoon which
I. Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct Handbook (Nova Scotia Barristers' Society, 2001), online:
NSBS Online <http://www.nsbs.ns.ca/handbook> [Handbook].
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could be incorporated into a PowerPoint presentation. 2 When I happened
on the cartoon which is described below, I knew I had found my hook.
Audience reaction confirmed my instinct. The cartoon shows three people,
two men and one woman, sitting at a boardroom table. They are of
indeterminate age. All are professionally attired. Papers and coffee mugs
are scattered across the table. The speaker, who sits at the head of the table,
is a man. The caption reads: "Some days I think the firm does more harm
than good. Fortunately, I'm totally OK with that."3
To me, the caption captures an uneasy truth about the profession-our
professional commitment to the ideal of justice may be more rhetorical
than real. Are we actually "doing good?" Or are we just "doing well"-at
least in individual financial terms?4 And if we are not, in fact, "doing
good" are we really "totally OK with that"? The image is more complex.
Who are the two silent colleagues? Junior lawyers? Partners? What is the
significance of their silence? Does it signal agreement? Acquiescence?
(Their facial expressions are neutral.) Or is one or the other about to speak?
What would or could they say if they were, in fact, appalled?
In this paper, I use the ideal of equality to respond to the cartoon. I
intend to develop an argument about the meaning of the equality value5 in
the context of professional responsibility. In my view, legal professionals
are implicated in two significant shifts-one, a shift in the way law is
practiced, increasingly in large firms where billable hours are the bottom
line and the best lawyers are those who work the longest hours6 ; and second,
2. My experience in search of legal humour was instructive. When I typed "lawyerjokes" into my
search engine, I came up with 234,000 sites in 1/4 of a second. Res ipsa loquitur!
3. "Stu's Views", online: <http://www.stus.com/sv/subjects/attacks.htm>.
4. There is a vast American literature on professional responsibility. The contrast between doing
good and doing well comes from the work of Deborah Rhode, Professor of Law and Director of the
Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession at Stanford Law School. Professor Rhode is
the author of eight books and numerous articles dealing with professional responsibility, legal ethics,
the public interest, and women in the profession. Her most recent book, In the Interests of Justice:
Reforming the Legal Profession (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2001), offers a system-
atic study of the challenges confronting the American legal profession. Collections of articles on the
book can be found at (2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. and (2002) 70 Fordham L. Rev. The Canadian literature
on professional responsibility is surprisingly underdeveloped. A good place to start is with Gavin
MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Scarborough, Ont.:
Carswell, 1993). See also Gavin MacKenzie, "Breaking the Dichotomy Habit: The Adversary Sys-
tem and the Ethics of Professionalism" (1996) 9 Can. J.L. & Juris. 33 and "The Valentine's Card in
the Operating Room: Codes of Ethics and the Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession" (1995) 33 Alta.
L.Rev. 859 (MacKenzie, "The Valentine's Card"].
5. The term "equality value" reflects a normative, systemic and institutionalized commitment to
the ideal of substantive equality as fundamental constitutional value. In my view, the "equality value"
must be understood to underpin every aspect of law and legal practice, in the same way as a commit-
ment to individual liberty undergirds our understanding of the rule of law. See section titled "The
Equality Value", below, and notes infra.
6. See MacKenzie, "The Valentine's Card", supra note 4; The Honourable Mr. Justice Frank
Iacobucci, "The Practice of Law: Business and Professionalism" (1991) 49 Advocate 859.
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a shift in the norms and values which animate the legal system, a shift
which reflects the increasing significance of what I will call the equality
value, a value which is responsive to change, diversity, discretion,
perspective and fairness.7 One of the most profound questions faced by
lawyers today is whether those two shifts are commensurate with, or
antithetical to, each other. Whatever the nature of practice, it is now fair to
say that understanding equality is a core competence for every legal
professional. Just as the equality value is changing the law, so should it
change our notions of what lawyers do and what professional responsibility
requires.
This article is organized into four sections. The first two are introductory
in nature-they examine the nature of professionalism and the increasing
significance of the equality value to law. The third section describes the
Social Context Education Project at the National Judicial Institute, a project
which I coordinated for two and a half years and which, in my view, reflects
the judiciary's commitment to an operationalized equality value in judicial
education. The final section explores the relationship between professional
responsibility and the equality value, and specifically considers three areas
where equality could be incorporated into our ethical and practice norms.
I. Professional Crisis or a Crisis of Professionalism?
The legal profession, as indeed other professions, is under public scrutiny
as never before. This is perhaps as it should be. We have, after all, a
public trust of considerable magnitude... Practice in Nova Scotia, on the
eve of publication of this Handbook, is facing rapid change, technological
and otherwise, characterized by growing law firms with expensive
overheads... It is commonly said that the practice of law is now a business.
There is talk of national and even international law firms. This will no
doubt intensify as we approach the 2 1 century. These changes must not
come at the expense of our ethics and standards.8
This excerpt from the foreword to the Nova Scotia Legal Ethics and
Professional Conduct Handbook was written by Frederick Wickwire Q.C.,
in February of 1990. Some thirteen years later, the words remain disturbingly
prophetic. What does it mean to practice law? Is law primarily a business?
7. Richard F. Devlin, "Jurisprudence for Judges: Why Legal Theory Matters For Social Context
Education" (2001) 27 Queen's L.J. 161.
8. Frederick B. Wickwire, Q.C., Chairman, Legal Ethics Handbook Committee, "Foreword" in
Handbook, supra note 1.
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Or is it (should it be) more than that? My experience on the admissions
committee at my law school (both as chair and member) suggests that at
least one segment of the public, potential students, does not envision the
practice of law as a business. Applicants to our faculty submit a personal
statement explaining their reasons for wanting to study law as part of their
admissions portfolio.9 A common theme in these statements 0 is the
applicants' desire to use a legal education to promote "justice," variously
conceived and understood. We rarely receive a statement which expresses
a keen interest in what one author has described as the most common work
experience for lawyers, that is to provide "legal assistance to business
corporations and business officials in their competitive struggles with other
business and their compliance struggles with government regulatory
authorities,"" or, even more pragmatically, to sell 1900 hours a year of
specialized legal-financial services to corporate interests. Yet, many of our
students end up in exactly this kind of practice, and are both envied and
admired for doing so. Not surprisingly, the student hierarchy reflects how
we seem to measure success in our profession. Even the law schools are
trapped in the ethic of profit-making. Our increasing dependence on private
funding for programs and services makes us reliant on the generosity of
large firms and financially successful alumni. Every student who heads
for Wall Street or Bay Street is a potential donor in ways that those who
head for government or public interest advocacy are not.
In a 1999 speech on professionalism, Justice Rosalie Abella suggested
that "the intensity of the public's disaffection [with the profession] is now
so palpable that it has started to affect the profession's own perception of
its professionalism."' 2 To many members of the public, the legal system is
unwieldy, unintelligible and unaffordable, 3 and lawyers are primarily
responsible. While few within the profession might characterize it as a
profession in crisis, many would no doubt agree with Justice Abella that as
professionals who enjoy the power of self-regulation in the public interest,
we need to take the evidence of public disaffection seriously. She suggests
9. Applicants are asked to explain their interest in law studies and to describe how significant
achievements in their lives, extracurricular activities, volunteer work or paid work experience have
shaped their views or created an interest in law. Applicants are also invited to discuss how their
language, culture, sexual identity, physical or learning disability, or racial background relate to their
interest in law studies.
10. I read over 6,000 statements during three years as chair and three years as committee member.
11. Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr., "Is There an American Legal Profession?" (2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1463
at 1469.
12. Rosalie Silberman Abella, "Perspectives: Professionalism revisited" (1999) 3:6 Ont. Law. Gaz.
20 at para. 6, online: Ontario Lawyers Gazette <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/gazette/gazettc.jsp>.
13. Rhode, supra note 4 at 2.
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that "the consensus about what it means to be a professional has broken
down, as has the consensus about what the criteria should be for awarding
good reputations"' 4 and argues that this fragmented consensus is a threat
to the profession's very legitimacy. Of course, one might argue that any
fragmentation of consensus is a good thing if it reflects the increasing
diversity of both the profession and the public which it serves. The
Honourable Bertha Wilson, in her capacity as chair of the Canadian Bar
Association (C.B.A.) Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal
Profession, 5 suggested that the influx of women had triggered a rethinking
of the meaning of professionalism. 16 For her, professionalism encompassed
more than service to the client, it required a commitment to justice, and
specifically to equality. More recently, the C.B.A. Task Force on Racial
Equality in the Legal Profession has affirmed the notion that professionalism
implies a commitment to equality. Both of these Task Force reports provide
an apparent opportunity for rethinking our professional and ethical norms.
I am concerned that this is not happening and that in fact the profession is
moving inexorably toward a vision of responsibility which is increasingly
individualized and corporatized and which prioritizes the bottom line over
the public interest.
II. The Equality Value
In June of 2001, Justice lacobucci, in a speech to a gathering of judges,
academics, lawyers and community representatives, characterized equality
as one of the fundamental moral underpinnings of our constitution. 8 In
1998, speaking after his retirement from the Supreme Court of Canada,
Justice Peter Cory predicted that legal debates in the early decades of the
21st century would be dominated by discussions of the meaning and
14. Abella, supra note 12 at para. 1_0.
15. The Canadian Bar Association Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profression, Touch-
stones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar Association,
1993) [Touchstones for Change].
16. For a discussion of the implications of Touchstonesfor Change, and in particular its recommenda-
tion about ongoing continuing education about gender equality, see Mary Jane Mossman, "Gender
Equality Education and the Legal Profession" (2000) 12 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 187.
17. The Working Group on Racial Equality in the Legal Profession, Racial Equality in the Legal
Profession (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar Association, 1999), online: CBA <http://www.cba.org/CBA/
Racial/PDF/ReportRacialEquality.pdf> [Racial Equality]. The Report contains two papers "The Chal-
lenges of Racial Equality: Putting Principles into Practice," as well as a paper prepared by co-chair
Joanne St. Lewis, "Virtual Justice: Systemic Racism and the Canadian Legal Profession."
18. The Honourable Frank lacobucci, "The Context of Social Context Education" June 2001 [on file
with the author].
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implementation of equality rights.' 9 Both the entrenchment of a Charter of
Rights with a broad and generous equality guarantee and its subsequent
substantive interpretation by the courts have confirmed the fundamental
nature of the principle of equality in the Canadian legal system.20 The
Supreme Court has given clear direction to the courts-judges are required
to administer the law in accordance with Charter principles and specifically
in a manner that conforms to and enhances the constitutional norm of
equality.2 ' This means that attentiveness to equality is required in every
legal context, not only when a Charter or human rights argument is made.
While the centrality of the Canadian equality value is beyond controversy,
and the need to take equality into account is legally mandated, the exact
nature of what is required in a particularized context remains contested
and contestable. In my view, attentiveness to equality requires, at the least,
attentiveness to four issues: 1) context; 2) the direct and indirect impact of
legal rules on lived experience; 3) a questioning of assumptions and a
willingness to think critically about the values embedded in the rules and
norms (including who is over and underrepresented, who is invisible and
who has power); 4) systemic dimensions. Being mindful of these four
aspects of any legal problem will help in the identification of the equality
dimensions of any legal issue but will not provide an answer. Paying
19. Speech given at the spring education meeting, May 1998, Superior Court of Justice for Ontario
[notes on file with the author]. Justice Cory predicted that cases dealing with the relationship between
aboriginal peoples and the legal system would also continue to increase.
20. Equality is constitutionalized in two ways. The first and most obvious is through the specific
Charter provisions which guarantee equality rights, s. 15 and s. 28. The second is through the language
and ideas used by courts to describe the fundamental values of our free and democratic society. In the
words of Chief Justice Dickson in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 136, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200:
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety
of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. Thus, when courts inter-
pret and apply the law they are obliged to ensure not only that equality rights are protected,
but also that the constitutional value of equality is respected and, if possible, enhanced.
21. The Supreme Court has held that the judiciary has an obligation to apply and develop the prin-
ciples of the common law in a manner consistent with the fundamental values enshrined in the Consti-
tution, including the fundamental value of equality. In Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995]
2 S.C.R. 1130, 126 D.L.R. (4th) 129, Cory J. wrote at para. 92:
Historically, the common law evolved as a result of the courts making those incremental
changes which were necessary in order to make the law comply with current societal values.
The Charter represents a restatement of the fundamental values which guide and shape our
democratic society and our legal system. It follows that it is appropriate for the courts to make
such incremental revisions to the common law as may be necessary to have it comply with the
values enunciated in the Charter.
See also RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 33 D.L.R. (4th) 174; Dagenais v. Cana-
dian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12.
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attention to equality is often hard, often confusing and always complex.
So is delivering justice.
III. The Social Context Education Project at the National Judicial Institute
Between January 1997 and July 1999, I acted as the full-time coordinator
of a national education program for judges at the National Judicial
Institute.12 The social context education project received funding from the
Department of Justice and had its genesis in a resolution of the Canadian
Judicial Council 3.2 The Canadian Judicial Council is chaired by the Chief
Justice of Canada and includes the Chiefs and Associate Chiefs of every
federally appointed court in the country. Its mandate is to "promote
efficiency and uniformity, and to improve the quality ofjudicial service in
superior courts. ' 24 The Council focuses on issues such as judicial continuing
education, the handling of complaints and the development of consensus
on issues involving the administration of justice. The social context
resolution, passed by Council in 1994, provided as follows:
[T]hat the Council approve the concept of comprehensive, in-depth,
credible education programs on social context issues which includes
gender and race [aboriginal peoples, black and other visible minorities] .
25
In September 1997, the Council made a further commitment that Chief
Justices would provide opportunities for judges to attend social context
programming 26 and in September 2000 the Council reaffirmed
22. Information about the National Judicial Institute (NJI) can be found on its website, <http:///
www.nji.ca>, which contains the following description:
The NJI is dedicated to the development and delivery of educational programs for all fed-
eral, provincial, and territorial judges. The Institute's programs stimulate continuing pro-
fessional and personal growth and reflect Canada's cultural, racial, and linguistic diversity,
as well as the changing demands on the judiciary in a rapidly-evolving society. The pro-
grams focus on the three major components of judicial education: substantive law, skills
training, and social context issues.
23. Information about the Canadian Judicial Council (CJC) can be found at the Council's website,
<http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca>.
24. Canadian Judicial Council, "About the Canadian Judicial Coutnci", online: CIC <http'/www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/english/aboutcjc.htm>.
25. Canadian Judicial Council, Annual Report 1993-1994 (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1994)
at 26, online: CJC <http://wvw.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/english/annual-reports/Annual-Report-1993-
1994.(English).pdf>.
26. Canadian Judicial Council, Annual Report 1997-1998 (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1998) at
7, online: CJC <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca/englishlannual-reports/1997-1998e-with-appendices.pdf>.
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the importance of pervasive treatment of relevant social context issues
including gender, aboriginal peoples, race, age and disability, in all
contexts in which judicial education occurs27
I arrived at the Institute in January 1997 with little more than the text of the
initial resolution and two background reports, both written by legal
academics," proposing both a justification and a general structure for the
implementation of the resolution. This project was immensely controversial
among the judiciary. Resistance to the concept of social context education
was primarily based on an ideal of judicial independence concerned with
advocacy outside the courtroom, the provision of unique access to judges
for "special interest groups"2 9 and the appropriate use by judges of
27. T. Brettel Dawson, "The Social Context Education Project at the National Judicial Institute: An
Overview" (May, 2002) [on file with the author]. It is interesting to note the change in the language of
the resolutions, and in particular, the expansion of the "social contexts" requiring examination. The
language of the resolutions reflects the evolution of thinking about the program by its designers, by
judge participants, by the NJI and by the CJC. The project began (Phase I) by offering intensive, desig-
nated programs on "social context" broadly conceived to include equality, impartiality, judicial inde-
pendence, and the judicial role in addition to workshop sessions on particular subjects such as violence
against women, expert evidence on race and culture, and family law in a multicultural and multiethnic
society. Judges were given the opportunity to attend these specialized programs. The resolution from
2000 demonstrates an understanding that social context pervades and infuses the judicial task writ
large. Phase II of the initiative has focussed on the "integration" of social context into all judicial
education primarily through an intensive judicial faculty training program. The current coordinator of
the program, Professor T. Brettel Dawson, has been instrumental in developing and delivering a series
of faculty development programs for judges from every region of the country with responsibilities for
and/or interest in education in their courts.
28. Lynn Smith, "Statement of Needs and Objectives for Continuing Judicial Education on the Social
Context of Judicial Decision-Making" [on file with the author]; Katherine Swinton, "Report to the
National Judicial Institute on Social Context Education for Judges" [on file with the author]. Both have
since been appointed to the bench-Justice Lynn Smith to the British Columbia Supreme Court and
Justice Katherine Swinton to the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario.
29. The question of who is a "special interest group" is fraught with political and ideological bag-
gage. Often the terminology is used as a justification for both exclusion and trivialization. Those who
were opposed to receiving information from "special interest" groups as part of continuing judicial
education tended more often to characterize equality seeking communities as representing special in-
terests. Lawyers, legal academics, and other judges tended not to be labelled in that way. See Gregory
Hein, "Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy" (2000) 6:2 Choices: Courts and Legisla-
tures I, for an analysis and discussion of interest groups at the Supreme Court of Canada. Hein demon-
strates that the interest groups who appear most frequently before the Court represent business and
corporate interest. See also FL. Morton & Avril Allen, "Feminists and the Courts: Measuring Success
in Interest Group Litigation in Canada" (2001) 34 Can. J. Pol. Sc. 55.
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information received during social context programming." One of the first
tasks for the project developers3 was to carefully reflect on the issue of
judicial independence. Was it a bar to social context education? The position
taken by the project, a position that had been accepted by both the NJI and
the CJC at the approval stage was that, in fact, judicial independence
provided a justification for social context education.32 Judicial independence
is not a stand alone value but rather a means to an end-the end being an
impartial judiciary. Impartiality, in turn, requires an open mind-not an
empty mind.33 For the purposes of decision-making, what is most desirable
is a judge with as complete a store of knowledge as possible-a store of
knowledge which is more than just the accidental result of the judge's
particular life experiences and social world.34 Continuing education dealing
30. The issue of if, when and how judges should use/take notice of the information provided during
education programs was frequently raised as a concern by judges. The provision of information
about social context issues raised special concerns for some judges because the topic was seen as
"more sociology than law." The interrelation between social context education, the law of judicial
notice, the requirement of impartiality and the recognition that judges, like all of us, bring their own
values, education and world view with them to the bench provoked many important discussions.
These issues were also addressed in many of the initial programs through education sessions on
impartiality, judicial notice and expert evidence. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R.
v. R.D.S., [ 1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, 151 D.L.R. (4th) 193 was especially timely, and was used as a vehicle
for analysis and discussion. For a range of views on these issues, see Bruce P. Archibald, "The Les-
sons of the Sphinx: Avoiding Apprehension of Judicial Bias in a Multi-racial, Multi-cultural Soci-
ety" (1997) 10 C.R. (5th) 54; David M. Paciocco, "The Promise of R.D.S.: Integrating the Law of
Judicial Notice and Apprehension of Bias" (1998) 3 Can. Crim. L. R. 319; Judge R. James (Jim)
Williams, "Grasping a Thorny Baton ... A Trial Judge Looks at Judicial Notice and Courts' Acqui-
sition of Social Science" (1996) 14 Can. Fam. L.Q. 179; Marilyn MacCrimmon, "Developments in
the Law of Evidence: The 1995-96 Term: Regulating Fact Determination and Commonsense Rea-
soning" (1997) 8 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 367; Marilyn MacCrimmon, "Fact Determination: Common
Sense Knowledge/Judicial Notice/Social Science Evidence" Conference Presentation [On File with
the Author]; The Honourable Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, "Making Equality Work in Family
Law" (1997) 14 Can. J. Fam. L. 103.
31. 1 was the first Coordinator of the Project and was employed full-time by the NJI for two and a
half years. Two judicial special directors of the project were appointed by the Chief Justice. They
were Justice Donna Martinson, then a member of the Provincial Court of British Columbia and
Justice John McGarry, a member of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Trial Division). A special
advisory group to the Social Context Education Project was appointed and met three times a year. In
addition, the project was overseen by the Board of Directors of the National Judicial Institute and
ultimately by the Canadian Judicial Council. Professor T. Brettel Dawson was the second Coordina-
tor of the Project at the NJI. Justice Donna Hackett, a member of the Ontario Court of Justice re-
placed Justice Martinson as Special Director and served in that position and as an Associate Director
of the National Judicial Institute until September 2003.
32. See Smith, supra note 28; Swinton, supra note 28.
33. 1 am grateful to Lynn Smith (as she then was) for this lovely turn of phrase.
34. See e.g. The Honourable Justice Beverley McLachlin (as she then was), "Judicial Neutrality
and Equality" (Paper presented to the Aspects of Equality- Rendering Justice Conference, November
1995) [unpublished, on file with the author]; The Honourable Justice Beverley McLachlin (as she
then was), "The Judicial Vision: From Partiality to Impartiality" (Paper presented to Nova Scotia
Judicial Education Seminar, June 1998) [unpublished, on file with the author]; Jennifer Nedelsky,
"Embodied Diversity and the Challenges to Law" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 91; The Honourable Maryka
Omatsu, "The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality" (1997) 9 C.J.WL. 1; Rosemary Cairns Way, "What is
Social Context Education" (1997) 10:3 National Judicial Institute 5; Devlin, supra note 7.
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with social context issues was one way of increasing that store of knowledge
and, therefore, of ensuring judicial impartiality.
The objectives of the project were developed over time and with the
benefit of experience. They were developed in consultation with judges,
academics and community leaders and included:
1. to assist judges to gain better understandings of the diverse
communities that they serve, the impacts of disadvantage and the
particular social, cultural and linguistic issues that shape the persons
who appear before them
2. to assist judges to examine their own assumptions, perspectives and
views of the world
3. to explore the impact of contextual inquiry on issues related to the
judicial role, judicial process and the process of judgment3"
In my view, the social context education project is about the
implementation of the equality value. Essentially, the project is a continuing
education vehicle which assists judges in examining the implications of
the fundamental norm of equality for the task of judging. Indeed, the
objectives set out above mirror the four equality related skills/questions
identified earlier-attention to context, examination of impact, critical
analysis and systemic thinking.
The Council's decision to recommend social context education
programming reflects, in my view, the Council's recognition of the
increasingly complex nature of judging in a legal system and society
characterized by change, diversity and inequality. It reflects an
understanding that the role of the judge is to ensure, inasmuch as possible,
equal justice to all, and that the delivery of equal justice requires both an
openness and an enlarged perspective that is attentive to difference.
Essentially, the judiciary was tracking something that had been occurring
in the academy for a number of decades, in the works of feminists and
critical theorists, critical race scholars and disability advocates, gay, lesbian
and bisexual theorists and poverty lawyers, and of aboriginal scholars: a
recognition that law is situated in a society of unequal power and access to
justice, that so-called neutral principles have disparate effects and that
learning about the law requires more than learning about the rules. Judicial
commitment to social context education is part of the larger project of
35. Faculty Development Materials, Phase II, Social Context Education Project, National Judicial
Institute [on file with the author].
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public legitimacy.36 The continuing involvement of the judiciary in social
context education signals a changing conception of the role of the judge in
a constitutionally-based democracy. All lawyers should heed this signal. It
is undeniably significant to our understanding of the meaning and scope of
professional responsibility.
IV Professional Responsibility and the Equality Value
How have we taken equality into account in the context of professional
responsibility? How can we do it better? The implementation of the equality
value is no longer optional, but legally imperative, and the judiciary has
taken the lead with the social context education project. It is essential for
lawyers to begin thinking about how equality might be incorporated and
operationalized into our conception of professional responsibility. Taking
equality into account is implicit in our obligation to regulate the profession
in the public interest, an interest which includes a commitment to equality.
The Mission Statement of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society is a classic
articulation of the aspirational ideals of the legal profession:
It is the object and duty of the society to regulate the practice of law
within Nova Scotia by:
(a) upholding and protecting the public interest through:
(i) preserving and protecting the rights of all persons in the fair
and impartial administration of justice,
(ii) ensuring the independence, integrity and honour of the legal
profession and its members, and
(iii) establishing, monitoring and enforcing standards for the
education, professional responsibility and competence of its
members.37
As the statement makes clear, the intended beneficiary of self-regulation
is the public. The public interest is served by having a legal system which
is fair and impartial, and a legal profession which is independent, honourable
36. Justice Rosalie Abella, supra note 12 at para. 15, describes the legitimacy issue this way:
The public is our audience, the people for whom we perform the justice play. They do not
direct us, but they are very interested in what is going on. If they stop clapping, we are in
deep trouble. We have to figure out if it is because of the script, the props, the cast, or all of
them. We know we will always have an audience, because the play is called the Rule of
Law, and the public's attendance is mandatory. Since we give the public no choice about
whether or not they are subject to the rule of law, we have to care about whether they like
the performance. They may not always be right, but they always have a right to be heard.
37. Nova Scotia Barristers & Solicitors Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 30, Regulation IA (Mission State-
ment of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society).
Reconceptualizing Professional Responsibility: Incorporating Equality 39
and competent. This final section of the paper will briefly examine three
aspects of self-regulation and practice. Each example-the role and
authority of the equity office within a professional regulatory body, the
structure and dimensions of professional continuing legal education and
its relation to competence, and the nature of client service-deserves a far
more detailed consideration than is possible here. The examples are offered
as catalysts for discussion, to begin a conversation about how the equality
value might be incorporated into professional responsibility.
1. Self-Regulation: The Equity Office
One of the important ways in which the profession has responded to the
equality agenda is through the creation of formal institutional structures
devoted to issues of equity and diversity. In Ontario, the Law Society of
Upper Canada has an equity office,3" in Nova Scotia, the Barristers' Society
has an equity officer.39 These institutional structures are the public face of
the profession's commitment to equality and equity. The mandates of these
programs are variously conceived but are primarily concerned with issues
such as the diversity of the profession, employment equity initiatives within
law firms, the development and implementation of workplace policies on
discrimination and harassment, advice and support on the appropriate
workplace accommodation for lawyers with special needs, offering training
programs on equity and diversity, delivering public education, providing
38. Information about the Equity Office can be found online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/eq-
uity/promo-equity.jsp>, which describes the Law Society's Equity initiatives as follows:
As part of the Law Society of Upper Canada's mandate to ensure access to justice, the Law
Society integrates equity and diversity values and principles into its policies, programs and
procedures. The Law Society seeks to ensure that both law and the practice of law are
reflective of all the peoples of Ontario, including Aboriginal peoples, Francophones and
equity-seeking groups. The Law Society also works to ensure that its workplace and the
legal profession are free of harassment and discrimination... The Law Society's Equity
Initiatives Department plays a leadership role in coordinating all of these activities. The
department was created in 1997 following the adoption of the Bicentennial Report on Eq-
uity Issues in the Legal Profession by the Law Society's governing body. The report sum-
marizes the work of the Law Society to promote equity and diversity in the legal profession
and the challenges of pursuing this direction in the future. The report also contains recom-
mendations to ensure the promotion of equity and diversity in Ontario's legal profession,
addressing such areas as ongoing policy development, legal education and governance.
39. The Society's website (www.nsbs.ns.ca/equity.html) offers the following description of the
Equity Officer program:
The Society is committed to addressing issues that will make the profession more diverse.
The Equity Officer works closely with the Race Relations Committee and Gender Equality
Committee in a program designed to increase the number of Black and Aboriginal lawyers
practising in Nova Scotia. As well, the Equity Officer is responsible for a wide range of
educational programs designed to increase the membership's understanding of issues of
prejudice and racism and their import on the legal profession.
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mentoring programs and, in some cases, community outreach. While the
goals of equity programs are admirable and the individuals who work within
them are dedicated professionals, it is nevertheless true that the capacity to
make change is directly linked to the resources and the institutional support
accorded the change-agent. In my view, the challenge for equity programs
is the seeming immutability of legal practice-the culture of law practice
is not a culture which gives priority to equality. If the culture of the
professional regulatory body is similarly resistant to equality values, the
equity office will remain a bit player in the larger drama of self-regulation.
Thus, while the public face of the profession is one that takes equality
seriously, the private reality is quite different. One example will suffice.
Anecdotal evidence from Career Services at the University of Ottawa Law
School, as well as from my experiences as Vice-Dean, suggests that the
articling interview process, despite ongoing attempts to educate firms about
human rights and diversity, continues to be as nightmarish an experience
for students from equality-seeking communities as it was twenty years
ago.40 Women are routinely asked about their personal lives and when and
if they intend to have children while students from racialized communities
are routinely asked how they intend to deal with racist clients (as if that is
their responsibility), and whether the likelihood of racist clients should be
a bar to their employment. These kinds of questions are patently
inappropriate and formally condemned by the Law Society4 1 (as well as
being actionable under Human Rights Legislation). That they seem to
continue unabated is testimony to the apparent imperviousness of law firm
culture to the language and the substance of equity and equality initiatives.
The continuing and disproportionate departure of women from the practice
of law, the underrepresentation of women and other members of equality-
seeking groups in senior law firm positions, the continuing and
40. The Law Society of Upper Canada has made an enormous effort to improve the articling re-
cruitment process. See generally the materials dealing with articling, online: LSUC <http://
www.lsuc.on.ca/services/phase2/pdf/prac-guidelines2002.pdf>. The Summary of Student Hiring
Practice Guidelines provides examples of inappropriate interview practices which include the ones I
detail in the text as well as, for example, "What country do you come from and what is your nation-
ality?" "Would you have concerns about working with people of religion x?" "What is your father's
occupation?" "How will you balance having kids, a husband and a job?" "Where are your parents/
grandparents from? Why don't you have an accent?"
41. In its Summary of Student Hiring Practice Guidelines, ibid., the Law Society recommends the
following Hiring Practices:
Interview questions should be valid and relevant to the job, and not relate directly or indi-
rectly to race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, creed, sex, sexual
orientation, age, record of offences, marital status, same-sex partnership status, family sta-
tus, or disability. In addition, the materials note that the Ontario Human Rights Code pro-
hibits the use of a written or oral inquiry that directly or indirectly classifies or indicates
qualification by a prohibited ground of discrimination.
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disproportionate lack of aboriginal lawyers, and the almost complete
absence of lawyers with disabilities4 2 suggests that the profession's public
stance about the seriousness of our commitment to equity is at odds with
the lived private reality of practice. Of course, the explanatory reasons for
the demographics of the bar, and the demographics of those with (and
without) power in the profession are complex and multidimensional. But
one way to respond to the disjunction between aspiration and reality is to
provide significant resources and real power to those who have been charged
institutionally with the task of implementing equity initiatives.
2. Continuing Legal Education (CLE)
The social context education project at the NJI demonstrated the
commitment of the judiciary to take equality seriously. That commitment
manifested itself in high-level institutional support (through the CJC, and,
at its highest level, the office of the Chief Justice) and, in general, a
willingness on the part of most judges to attend and to take very seriously
education programs that dealt with social context. During Phase I, every
province and virtually every court in the country offered two-and three-
day long intensive programs where judges worked with other judges,
lawyers, legal academics and community leaders to explore equality issues.
Attendance at these programs was not mandatory, but the reality was that
the overwhelming majority of judges participated-some reluctantly, but
most willingly-and as a result, spent a concentrated period of time
confronting the kinds of questions earlier identified. This is of enormous
significance; it signals a capacity and willingness by the courts of this
country to take equality seriously.
The profession is far behind the judiciary in this regard. I would argue
that our professional duty to be competent coupled with our public
responsibility to protect the fairness and impartiality of the justice system
means that we should take continuing education and professional
development far more seriously. In a recent exploration of legal ethics,
Justice Bastarache suggested that lawyers take personal and professional
42. The demographics of the profession have been widely examined. See Touchstones for Change,
supra note 15; Mossman, supra note 16; Racial Equality, supra note 17. See also Fiona Kay & Joan
Brockman, "Barriers to Gender Equality in the Canadian Legal Establishment" (2000) 8 Fern. Legal
Stud. 169; Alex M. Johnson, Jr., "The Underrepresentation of Minorities in the Legal Profession: A
Critical Race Theorist's Perspective" (1997) 95 Mich. L.Rev. 1005; Chris Tennant, "Discrimination
in the Legal Profession, Codes of Professional Conduct and the Duty of Non-Discrimination" (1992)
15 Dal. L.J. 464; Esmerelda M.A.Thornhill, "Ethics in the Legal Profession: The Issue of Access"
(1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 810; Joan Brockman, Gender in the Legal Profession: Fitting or Breaking the
Mould (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2001); Michael Ornstein, Lawyers in Ontario: Evidence from the
1996 Census, A Report for the Law Society of Upper Canada (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada,
2001), online: LSUC <http://lsuc.on.ca/equity/pdf/societyreport_revisedl6.jan.pdf>.
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responsibility for implementing the ethic of impartiality, by recognizing
the reality of unconscious bias and systemic discrimination. 43 Justice
Bastarache went on to suggest that "all members of the profession must
broaden their knowledge of social realities, appreciate the legal significance
of stereotypes and promote equality in every way possible."'4 4 A
commitment to equality means a reexamination of our professional
commitment to continuing legal education. It means revisiting the question
of whether continuing education should be mandatory, and reexamining
the connection between continuing legal education and competence.45 More
fundamentally, it requires careful thinking about the nature of professional
competence. The judiciary has recognized and acknowledged the public
dimensions ofjudicial education by actively developing education vehicles
which aim for public credibility, not just judicial acceptance.46 The
profession should do the same. Examining the kinds of education offered
through CLE programs is one place to start. I suspect that CLE has too
often been shaped by the relatively narrow doctrinal needs of practitioners.
Continuing legal education should be responsive to the larger framework
within which the law operates-it should engage lawyers in the same way
as judges across the country have been engaged on the implementation of
the equality value. It should do so because the public interest requires it.
3. Serving Clients: Aboriginal Residential School Litigation
The Professional Regulation Committee of the Law Society of Upper
Canada is currently considering a set of practice guidelines. The Guidelines
for Aboriginal Residential School Litigation began at the C.B.A. in 2000.47
43. The Honourable Justice Michel Bastarache, "The Ethical Duties of the Legal Professional"
Speech delivered at the Gale Cup Moot, Toronto, 1998 [on file with the author].
44. Ibid. at 9.
45. 1 do not mean to suggest that professional regulatory bodies have not taken these issues seri-
ously. The Law Society of Upper Canada has undertaken exhaustive work on continuing legal educa-
tion and on the definition of competence. See e.g. The Final Report of the Competence Task Force
(1998) and Implementing the Law Society s Competence Mandate (2000). Both documents are avail-
able in pdf format online and contain links to other Law Society reports and background documents.
See generally online: Law Society of Upper Canada <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services>. Thirty eight
American states make CLE compulsory, as do England and Wales, and New South Wales in Austra-
lia. In Canada, nurses, physicians and surgeons, accountants, actuaries and architects all make con-
tinuing education mandatory. See the appendices to the Consultation Document on Competence,
online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/competence-appendix200006.jsp>.
46. The Social Context Education Project has actively incorporated members of the community
into all aspects of its planning and delivery process.
47. The guidelines were posted on the website of the Nova Scotia Barristers' Society in the An-
nouncements section on Nov. 30, 2000 (online: NSBS <http://www.nsbs.ns.ca/notices/
cbaguidelines.htm>). The preamble to the posting reads as follows: The Society's Legal Ethics
Committee suggested that these [the guidelines] be made available in an abbreviated form for the
information of the membership (ibid. at para. 1).
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In Ontario, the Professional Regulation Committee struck a special
subcommittee in cooperation with the Equity and Aboriginal Issues
Committee to consider the C.B.A. guidelines. The subcommittee considered
some of the following alleged practices:
" Lawyers sending unsolicited letters to Residential School Survivors which
may include detailed and lengthy questionnaires requesting explicit
information about experiences in residential schools including accounts
of physical and sexual abuse from the survivor...
" Lawyers offering to pay survivors $50 cash if they agree to sign a retainer
agreement with the lawyer...
" Lawyers sending clients detailed opinion letters with complicated
instructions requiring clients to opt in or out of certain processes, etc.
without making themselves available to the client to discuss and explain
the opinion. Lawyers refusing to accept collect phone calls from indigent
clients...
" Lawyers requiring aging survivor clients to amend their wills naming the
lawyer as Executor of their estates prior to agreeing to proceed with their
cases.
48
Many of these abuses fall within the Rules of Professional Conduct49
but the working committee chose to respond to them systemically in the
form of guidelines specifically directed to the particular context in which
the abuses occurred. Here are some excerpts from the draft guidelines,
included in some detail because of the obvious care taken by the committee
in their drafting:
1. Lawyers should recognize and respect the unique nature of Aboriginal
Residential school cases and appreciate Survivors' need for "healing" in
the legal process. Lawyers should recognize and respect the special nature
of Survivors' cases and should assist in facilitating their client's healing
process through, where possible:
a) identifying and providing referrals to appropriate community
resources, including counselling resources, to assist the client;
b) referring their client to treatment programs, if appropriate;
c) recognizing and respecting the need for the client to develop a personal
support network.
48. The Report to Convocation of the Professional Regulation Committee (Toronto: Law Society of
Upper Canada, 2002) at 3, online: LSUC <http://www.lsuc.on.ca/news/pdf/convfebO2_profregulation.pdf>.
49. Ibid. at 4.
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2. Lawyers should recognize and respect that Aboriginal Residential School
cases place unique demands on the lawyer and other law office staff by
virtue of the complicated legal issues, the emotional nature of such cases,
the amount of time and resources required for each case, the special
needs of Survivor clients, the potential need for crisis intervention and
management, and the lawyer's role in facilitating the client's healing
process. Lawyers should recognize and respect that these demands may
place a practical limit on the number of cases which they can competently
and responsibly take on at any one time.
3 ... Lawyers acting in Aboriginal Residential School cases are encouraged
to ensure employee assistance programs are available for law office
lawyers and staff.
4. Given the specific knowledge required to responsibly serve the legal
needs of Aboriginal Peoples, the special nature of Residential School
cases, and the various legal processes that exist in those cases, lawyers
should ensure they are competent to act prior to accepting clients in these
matters.
5. Lawyers should appreciate the need for the utmost sensitivity in dealing
with Survivors. Lawyers should ensure that the methods they employ in
making legal services available to Survivors are culturally appropriate...
9 ... Lawyers should recognize and respect the special communication needs
that some Survivors may have including language barriers, cultural
barriers, and limited access to telephone service...
10. Sensitivity to the emotional, spiritual and intellectual needs of Survivors
is necessary in the provision of legal services to Survivors. Lawyers
acting for Survivors should recognize and respect that many Survivors
have had control taken from their lives when they were children and
therefore, as clients, should be routinely informed about and consulted
as much as possible on direction of the case... Lawyers should also
recognize and respect that for Survivors, interaction with lawyers and
the legal process can be extremely stressful and difficult.
12. Lawyers should recognize and respect that Survivors may be seriously
damaged from their experiences which may include cultural damages
resulting from being cut off from their own society, culture and traditions.
These experiences may be aggravated by having to relive their childhood
abuse, and healing may be a necessary component of any real settlement
for Survivors. Lawyers acting for both plaintiffs and defendants should
endeavour to understand and respect Survivors' cultural roots, customs
and traditions. 0
50. Ibid. at 6-9.
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The working group is sufficiently self-critical to recognize that their
expertise and perspective will be necessarily partial. They ask for comments
from other potential stakeholders-most particularly from representatives
of the aboriginal community. And finally the preamble to the guidelines
explicitly recognizes that the principles in the guidelines may apply to
lawyers acting in cases involving other victims of institutional abuse or
other vulnerable clients.
These guidelines are exemplary of how ethical practice is informed
and transformed by an operationalized equality principle. They particularize
the circumstances of the client group that is, they counsel practice which is
attentive to context. They locate the lawyer's practice obligations inside a
larger social context with respect to the aboriginal community-and
characterize the objective of the provision of legal services in a manner
which reflects that community. They are attentive to impact. They counsel
respect for and inclusion of appropriate community resources. They
contextualize competence and encourage critical self-analysis. They
challenge lawyers to learn about and be respectful of the client's
community-not only for the lawyer representing the client but for all the
lawyers involved. The guidelines model an approach to client service which
is broadly applicable, not in the sense that all clients will have these
particular needs-but in the sense that they establish a protocol for thinking
about client service in a way that has the potential to incorporate equality.
It is a protocol that reflects the equality value emphasizing context, impact,
critical thinking and systemic analysis.
Conclusion
What are the implications of the fact that lawyer self-regulation is explicitly
legitimized with reference to the public interest? It is clear that the public
interest has an equality dimension. The profession's failure to take account
of the equality interest may well be symptomatic of a larger disengagement
with the public interest, or at least with a privileging of the private interests
of lawyers and clients. Do Law Societies systematically devalue the public
interest, or do they have an impoverished vision of what the public interest
requires? A public interest which never requires lawyers to compromise
their professional self-interest is a public interest without a public
dimension, a public interest which has been appropriated in the service of
the profession. 1 Deborah Rhode argues that the public interest has played
51. I am indebted to my colleague Joanne St. Lewis for this insight. Professor St. Lewis is a bencher
of the Law Society of Upper Canada.
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too little part in determining professional responsibilities.52 She suggests
that the profession's core set of professional commitments (resolute
advocacy, client confidentiality, the adversary system) have generated a
set of habitual professional practices justified with reference to their socially
beneficial aggregate effects. Practices which look unethical-delaying
tactics, destructive cross-examination, procedural abuses-are justified
through reliance on the larger public interest. In Professor Rhode's view,
the difficulty with the justification is that it is plainly demonstrable that in
many situations these practices subvert the very values-justice, truth,
individual dignity, freedom and equality-that they are intended to serve.53
Rhode's prescription is to encourage lawyers, both individually and
collectively, to take responsibility for the consequences of their professional
actions and to engage in a process of self-justification which looks beyond
immediate self-interest and unexamined generalizations. The lawyer must
believe in that self-justification fully, or risk being a mere provider of service
for money and not a professional.54
These thoughts bring me full circle to my original "hook." It is "not
OK to do more harm than good." Being a legal professional requires a
lifelong commitment to education, to professional development and critical
self-awareness. A commitment to equality requires that habits of client
service be attentive to context, impact and the systemic dimensions of the
legal issue. An ethical practitioner takes the public interest seriously, and
takes responsibility for the consequences of their professional actions. My
final words are directed to law students. A famous educator once spoke
about how teachers can appeal to the young. 5 He said that there are three
ways of trying to convince the young. One is to preach-that is the hook
without the worm-the second is to command-that is the devil-the third
is the appeal which does not fail-to tell you that you are needed. You are
needed by the profession and by the public-and you can make a difference.
52. Rhode, supra note 3 at 17ff.
53. See Robert W Gordon, "Portrait of a Profession in Paralysis" (2002) 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1427 at
1428-29. Professor Gordon suggests that relying on the truth seeking and autonomy promoting qualities
of the adversary system to justify resolute advocacy ignores the fact that most people cannot afford
to even access the adversary system and that, in fact, effective advocacy often operates to obscure
and distort the truth through tactics such as the discrediting of truthful witnesses and the use of
competing expert witnesses. Similarly, an ethic which focuses solely on protecting the autonomy of
individual clients and which separates the clients from the larger social context in which they operate
fails to distinguish between client choices that deserve protection and those that do not, and simulta-
neously ignores the harms that clients, assisted or protected by lawyers, may inflict on third parties
or on society.
54. Justice Bastarache makes the same point in "The Ethical Duties of a Legal Professional," supra
note 43.
55. The educator was Kurt Hahn, the founder of Outward Bound International and the Gordonstoun
School. See online: Kurt Hahn <http://www.kurthahn.org> for more information.
